Choosing the Law Governing Security Interests in International Bankruptcies by Harris, Steven L.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 32
Issue 3




Choosing the Law Governing Security Interests in
International Bankruptcies
Steven L. Harris
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Steven L. Harris, Choosing the Law Governing Security Interests in International Bankruptcies, 32 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2007).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol32/iss3/7
CHOOSING THE LAW GOVERNING 
SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BANKRUPTCIES 
Steven L. Harris* 
s one who approaches international bankruptcies1 with security 
interests2 in the foreground, I was immediately struck by The 
American Law Institute’s acknowledgment that two of the bankruptcy 
choice-of-law issues confronting holders of security interests—which 
jurisdiction’s avoidance law should apply and which jurisdiction’s prior-
ity scheme should apply—are particularly difficult to resolve as a practi-
cal matter and that “[p]riority problems, including the choice of law to 
govern [security interests], are among the greatest obstacles to achieve-
ment of a unified approach to the general default of multinational com-
panies.”3 Mindful of the Institute’s admonition that the solution to these 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author thanks Elizabeth 
DeArmond, David Gerber, Charles Mooney, and Mark Rosen for their helpful comments. 
Citations to the official text of, and comments to, the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“U.C.C.”) are to the version that appears in Uniform Commercial Code 1 (2005 ed. 
West). Citations to “former” U.C.C. Article 1 are to the version of Article 1 found id. at 
1879. Citations to “former” U.C.C. Article 9 are to the version of Article 9 found id. at 
1775.  
 1. As has become customary in this context, I use “bankruptcy” to include proceed-
ings for liquidation and reorganization and limit my discussion to corporate debtors. 
 2. I use the term according to its definition in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 
(2005). “The term ‘security interest’ means lien created by agreement.” Bankruptcy Code 
§ 101(51). “The term ‘lien’ means charge against or interest in property to secure pay-
ment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” Id. § 101(37). As used in the U.C.C., the 
term “security interest” includes many outright sales of accounts and other receivables. 
U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(b)(35) (definition of “security interest”); § 9-109(a)(3), (d) (applica-
bility of Article 9). I deal here only with security interests that secure obligations; how-
ever, the analysis may be relevant to a discussion of other transfers of personal property, 
including transfers of ownership (whether governed by or excluded from Article 9). 
 3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: PRINCIPLES OF 
COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 18 (2003) [hereinafter “ALI PRINCIPLES”] 
(relying upon Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution In Transnational 
Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests, 73 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 385 (1999) and Jay L. Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 27 
(1998)). Of course, holders of security interests are concerned about which law will gov-
ern various other aspects of a bankruptcy. These include whether (to the extent the secu-
rity interest enjoys priority) the secured party will be entitled to recover the collateral 
itself or just the value of the collateral. If just the value, under which standard of valua-
tion? How long a delay before the secured party will receive a distribution? What hap-
pens during the delay (e.g., may the debtor use or sell the collateral)? How are costs and 
risks attendant to the delay (e.g., the opportunity cost to the secured party; the risk of a 
A 
906 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
problems probably must await “some level of institutional advance,”4 I 
nevertheless have chosen to avail myself of the opportunity that this 
Symposium presents by pursuing some tentative, exploratory work on 
the subject. 
I. THE NEED FOR PREDICTABILITY 
These important choice-of-law issues are difficult in large part because 
they implicate an array of desiderata, no one of which can be satisfied in 
full without impairing the satisfaction of another (or so it seems). As 
have others, I take “predictability” to be a principal desideratum of the 
content of choice-of-law rules.5 Financial institutions and others who 
extend secured credit (“secured parties”) desire certainty. By entering 
into a secured transaction with a debtor, secured parties have taken steps 
designed to increase the likelihood of being paid. A security interest is 
meant to afford reasonable assurance that, if the debtor defaults in pay-
ment or performance of the secured obligation, the secured party will 
have the legal right and practical ability to use the collateral as a source 
from which the secured obligation can be recovered. Anything that pro-
spectively undermines the assurance reduces the value of the security 
interest. Whatever reduces the value of the security interest increases the 
cost of the credit transaction. And, as we all know, the debtor typically 
bears at least part of the increase. 
The desire for certainty concerning the choice of law governing secu-
rity interests in personal property fueled the tremendous and remarkably 
successful drive for a uniform effective date for revised Uniform Com-
mercial Code Article 9.6 Inasmuch as revised Article 9 strongly resem-
bles its predecessor in most respects, one might have minimized the im-
                                                                                                             
reduction in the nominal value of collateral through depreciation or loss) allocated be-
tween the secured party and other creditors? This article does not address these concerns. 
 4. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 18. 
 5. Both territorialists and universalists claim that their approach to international 
bankruptcies fosters predictability. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territo-
riality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Jay Lawrence West-
brook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007); Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 499 (1991). By stating that predictability is a desideratum, I should not be un-
derstood to say that it is the only desideratum. Other concerns are discussed below. 
 6. See U.C.C. § 9-701 (providing for effective date of July 1, 2001). All fifty states 
and the District of Columbia enacted revised Article 9 prior to the uniform effective date, 
and on that date the revised Article took effect in all but four states. G. Ray Warner, Non-
uniform Effective Dates and the Transition to Revised Article 9, AM. BANKR. INST., avail-
able at http://68.72.75.1/abidata/online/journaltext/01jullien.html (last visited Apr. 25, 
2007). 
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portance of temporal uniformity. The official comments observe, how-
ever, that “[w]hile always important, uniformity is essential to the suc-
cess of this Article.” As the primary example, the comments refer to the 
change wrought by revised Article 9 in the designation of the jurisdiction 
whose law governs perfection of a security interest. “[H]orrendous com-
plications may arise” if “the status of a particular security interest as per-
fected or unperfected[] would depend on whether the matter was litigated 
in a State in which former Article 9 was in effect or a State in which [the 
revised] Article was in effect. . . . Any one State’s failure to adopt the 
uniform effective date will greatly increase the cost and uncertainty sur-
rounding the transition.”7 
The differences among the various legal regimes governing secured 
credit around the world are, to say the least, substantially greater than the 
differences between former and revised Article 9. The absence of uni-
formity among potentially governing laws may impose much more sig-
nificant costs on a secured transaction that implicates more than one na-
tion than on an otherwise identical transaction that implicates only U.S. 
jurisdictions. The differences among national regimes go far beyond 
questions of how to “perfect” a security interest. Rather, the very effec-
tiveness of a secured transaction may depend on the jurisdiction whose 
law governs.8 
As others have explained at length, merely adding the possibility of a 
collective proceeding reduces predictability and increases costs (unless 
the collective proceeding has absolutely no effect on the rights of the 
secured party with respect to the collateral).9 These include the costs at-
tendant to strategic behavior (e.g., depending on whether bankruptcy law 
treats a particular creditor’s claim more or less favorably than non-
bankruptcy law, the creditor has an incentive to push the debtor into 
bankruptcy or keep the debtor out) and those attendant to planning for 
multiple outcomes.10 If maximizing predictability and minimizing costs 
for secured parties were the only considerations, we might prefer a bank-
ruptcy law that affords to the secured party the identical rights as other-
wise applicable non-bankruptcy law affords and that leaves security in-
terests completely unaffected. Of course, the same could be said for un-
secured claims; making the rights of unsecured creditors turn on whether 
                                                                                                             
 7. U.C.C. § 9-701, cmt. 
 8. To a very limited extent, this was the case with respect to the difference between 
former and revised Article 9. See id. 
 9. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 203–
04 (1986). A collective proceeding addresses the claims of many, and sometimes all, 
creditors of a given debtor. 
 10. Id. at 196–97. 
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the debtor is the subject of a collective proceeding imposes costs. Pre-
sumably, a bankruptcy proceeding confers benefits that more than offset 
these costs. Otherwise, we would be content with non-bankruptcy law. 
This analysis suggests that bankruptcy law should affect a secured 
party’s non-bankruptcy rights only to the extent necessary to produce the 
benefits that a collective proceeding affords. A secured party’s principal 
concern is recovering promptly the full amount of its claim. From this 
perspective, one might favor a bankruptcy law that gives a secured party 
a recovery whose value equals the recovery that, as a practical matter, 
would have been obtained in the absence of a bankruptcy. In the first 
instance, this means that a security interest should be eligible for priority 
with respect to the value of the collateral. That is, a bankruptcy law 
should recognize the distinction between secured and unsecured claims.11 
If applicable non-bankruptcy law treats a given claim as secured by par-
ticular assets, the claim should be eligible for the same treatment under 
bankruptcy law.12 
II. UNIFORM CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES: A SECOND-BEST SOLUTION 
Where a secured transaction implicates more than one jurisdiction, 
which jurisdiction’s non-bankruptcy law is applicable? The answer 
would make little difference if the substantive law governing creation of 
a security interest were uniform throughout the world and all the various 
bankruptcy laws gave effect to security interests: The same outcome 
would obtain regardless of which jurisdiction’s substantive law a bank-
ruptcy court were to apply.13 The fact is, however, that secured-credit 
regimes are notoriously nonuniform, and there is little reason to believe 
that uniformity will be achieved in the near, or even the middle, term. 
Given this substantive nonuniformity, the best way to achieve predict-
ability may well be to push for uniformity in the governing choice-of-law 
rule.14 
With a single choice-of-law rule (or set of choice-of-law rules) that is 
applied universally, a secured party would know which jurisdiction’s 
                                                                                                             
 11. I use the terms “secured claim” and “unsecured claim” as they are used in Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2005). 
 12. As I suggested, the fact that a security interest is being treated in a collective pro-
ceeding is likely to require that the treatment it receives will differ from the non-
bankruptcy treatment. Differences in treatment arising from collectivist considerations, 
including the application of avoidance powers, are discussed below. 
 13. This is not to say that we would be living in a world of complete predictability. 
Uncertainty of meaning and application would attend even a uniform law. 
 14. Note, however, that the unpredictability that attends any judicial determination is 
exacerbated when the court applies the law of a foreign jurisdiction. 
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substantive secured-credit regime would apply to any given secured 
transaction. A uniform choice-of-law rule would be more costly than a 
uniform substantive law of secured transactions.15 It would require se-
cured parties whose transactions implicate many jurisdictions to familiar-
ize themselves with a variety of secured-transactions laws. However, a 
uniform choice-of-law rule would be a marked improvement over the 
current situation, where a secured party in an international transaction 
must assess the likelihood of its security interest being challenged in 
courts of different nations and determine which substantive law each of 
those courts would be likely to apply. 
III. CHOOSING THE CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 
A. The Lex Situs Approach 
What should be the content of a uniform choice-of-law rule? As a gen-
eral matter, courts apply the law of the situs of property—the lex situs—
to determine the existence and enforceability of claims to the property.16 
While some have criticized the results of indiscriminate application of 
the situs rule, even with respect to real property,17 there would seem to 
be good reasons to apply the law of the situs to determine in the first in-
stance whether a security interest will be recognized in a debtor’s bank-
ruptcy. 
Suppose, for example, that a secured party (“SP”) claims a security in-
terest in goods owned by a debtor (“Debtor”) and located in a particular 
nation (“State A”). The physical presence of the goods is the only (or at 
least the primary) connection between State A and the transaction par-
ties, whose other contacts are all with another nation (“State B”). If SP 
wants to enforce its security interest against an unwilling Debtor, in all 
likelihood it will need to invoke the assistance of a sheriff or comparable 
public official from State A. It may be the case that a public official will 
assist SP in response to a judgment entered by State B. But SP’s safest 
and surest course is to seek a determination by a State A court that SP 
has a property claim that supports enforcement. To make this determina-
tion, the State A court normally will consult its own law. At least as to 
the effectiveness of the secured transaction between the immediate par-
ties, the law of State A may well give effect to the parties’ express choice 
                                                                                                             
 15. The statement in the text assumes that the uniform substantive law does not itself 
impose large, unnecessary costs. 
 16. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 222, cmt. b (1971). 
 17. See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th 
ed. 2006). 
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of law within fairly broad limits.18 If State A law gives effect to party 
autonomy in this setting and the parties to the security agreement provide 
that their rights are governed by the law of State B, then a State A court 
is likely to look to the substantive law of State B to determine whether a 
security interest has been created. If not, then a State A court is likely to 
look to the substantive law of State A. 
The determination whether SP has an in rem claim to the collateral 
may be relevant not only to the resolution of a “property” question, i.e., 
whether SP holds a security interest enforceable against the debtor,19 but 
also to the resolution of a “priority” question: How is the value of the 
collateral to be allocated between SP and a competing creditor or pur-
chaser of the collateral (“X”)? Just as recognition of SP’s security inter-
est should depend on whether it would be recognized by the courts of 
State A, so should the recognition of other asserted in rem claims. That is 
to say, where property is located in State A, a third party may need to 
invoke the power of the courts of State A to realize the benefits of its 
property interest. For the same reason, the relative ranking of two in rem 
claims (e.g., whether X’s claim is superior or junior to SP’s), should be 
(and in many jurisdictions is) decided by the law of situs of the goods. 
There also is likely to be a cost savings if a court applies the law of State 
A to both the property and priority questions. 
In some jurisdictions, the bankruptcy administrator (in the U.S., the 
trustee in bankruptcy) enjoys the rights and powers of an in rem creditor 
or purchaser.20 In such cases I would determine those relative rights by 
reference to the same law as I would apply to determine the existence of 
a cognizable security interest—the law of the location of the collateral. 
So, in the example above, if the applicable bankruptcy law provides that 
collateral comes into the bankruptcy estate free of any security interest 
that would be subordinate to the rights of a judicial lien creditor, then the 
court would look to the substantive law of State A to determine whether 
SP’s security interest would be junior or senior to the rights of a creditor 
who acquires a judicial lien through the judicial process of State A.21 
                                                                                                             
 18. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (2001) (a transaction bearing a “reasonable relation” 
to that state will trigger application of that state’s act); former U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2000). 
 19. Under Article 9, a security interest that has become enforceable against the debtor 
is said to have attached. See U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2001) (“[a] security interest attaches 
when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral”); id. 9-
203(b) (explaining when a security interest becomes enforceable). 
 20. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2005). 
 21. Even a state that permits the parties to establish property rights between them-
selves under the law of another state is most unlikely to permit the parties to impose the 
other state’s law on third parties. Compare U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(2) (2001) (affording parties 
broad autonomy to choose the governing law) with U.C.C. § 1-301(g) (2001) (providing 
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ALI Principles observes that “the traditional choice-of-law rules for se-
cured transactions are coming under increasing pressure.”22 It refers spe-
cifically to the fact that revised Article 9 “abandons for certain purposes 
the traditional lex situs rule in favor of a location rule that depends inter-
nationally on a post-hoc conclusion about the substance of the debtor’s 
security-interest law.”23 The scope of this abandonment should not be 
overstated. Where the security interest is possessory (i.e., tangible collat-
eral is in the possession of the secured party), the law of the jurisdiction 
in which the collateral is located governs the priority of competing 
claims to the collateral.24 And even in the much more common case 
where the debtor remains in possession of tangible collateral, the situs 
rule applies: the priority of a security interest is governed by the law of 
the jurisdiction where the collateral is located.25 Indeed, as regards tangi-
ble collateral, revised Article 9 departs from the situs rule only with re-
spect to whether a nonpossessory security interest is perfected. As to 
such a security interest, perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdic-
tion in which the debtor is located.26 The “location of the debtor” choice-
of-law rule tells the forum court that (1) the applicable priority rule is 
that of the law of the situs and (2) if the priority law of the situs turns on 
whether a security interest is perfected or unperfected, the court should 
determine whether the security interest enjoys perfected status by refer-
ence to the perfection requirements of the debtor’s location. 
                                                                                                             
that, to the extent the U.C.C. governs a transaction, the parties’ agreement is ineffective 
to the extent it is contrary to the Article 9 choice-of-law rules governing perfection and 
priority). 
 22. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 19. 
 23. Id. The rule in question is found in U.C.C. § 9-307(b) (2001). For a discussion of 
this choice-of-law rule and its potential for universal applicability, see Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., Extraterritorial Impact of Choice of Law Rules for Non-United States Debt-
ors under Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 and a New Proposal for Interna-
tional Harmonization, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND INSOLVENCY 187 (Michael 
Bridge & Robert Stevens eds. 2001). 
 24. See U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (2001). For these purposes, “tangible” collateral that is 
subject to “possession” includes not only goods but also money and intangibles that have 
been reified, such as instruments, tangible negotiable documents of title, and tangible 
chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-102(a) (2001) (defining “instru-
ment,” “document,” “chattel paper,” and “tangible chattel paper”); U.C.C. 1-201(b)(16) 
(2001) (defining “tangible document of title”); U.C.C. § 7-104 (2001) (explaining when a 
document of title is negotiable). 
 25. U.C.C. § 9-301(3)(c) (2001). 
 26. U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001). 
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As a general matter, nonpossessory perfection will be accomplished by 
filing a financing statement in the public record.27 From the perspective 
of predictability, assuming that the court applies the “uniform” choice-
of-law rules in Article 9, a secured party has comfort that, if it takes the 
perfection steps specified by the local law of the debtor’s jurisdiction, it 
will enjoy perfected status for purposes of applying the priority rules of 
the situs. Put otherwise, from a planning perspective, as applied to secu-
rity interests in goods, the effect of Article 9’s nontraditional choice-of-
law rule (location of the debtor) ordinarily is to tell the secured party 
what to file and where to file it. The wrinkle for international transac-
tions, under which the law governing perfection turns on a “post-hoc 
conclusion about the substance of the debtor’s security-interest law,”28 
reflects Article 9’s paramount concern for public notice in a world in 
which most non-U.S. jurisdictions do not have a public-notice system for 
secured transactions in personal property.29 In short, nothing in the policy 
underlying revised Article 9’s choice-of-law provisions suggests that the 
validity and priority of a security interest in the debtor’s bankruptcy 
should be determined other than under the non-bankruptcy substantive 
law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located (in the example, 
State A).30 Indeed, this is the approach of the UNCITRAL Draft Legisla-
                                                                                                             
 27. See § U.C.C. 9-310(a) (2001) (stating the general rule that a financing statement 
must be filed to perfect all security interests and setting forth exceptions); U.C.C. § 9-
307(b) (2001) and (c) (debtor is located in the District of Columbia if the ordinary rules 
for determining its location point to a jurisdiction whose law does not generally condition 
perfection on public filing or recording). Filing works to perfect a security interest in 
nearly all kinds of collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001). The principal exceptions are 
deposit accounts, money, letter-of-credit rights, and goods covered by a certificate of 
title. See U.C.C. § 9-311(a) (2001); § 9-312(b) (2001). 
 28. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 19. 
 29. One might infer from U.C.C. § 9-307(c) (2001) that Article 9’s concern that secu-
rity interests be evidenced by public notice trumps its concern that outcomes be predict-
able. 
 30. By “non-bankruptcy substantive law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is 
located,” I mean the substantive law that the court would apply, taking into account its 
choice-of-law rules. The renvoi would seem to serve no useful purpose in this setting. See 
Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 997–1002 (1991). Ideally, 
then, if State A’s choice-of-law rules referred to the law of another state, it would refer 
only to that state’s local law and not its whole law. Revised Article 9 adopts this ap-
proach. See U.C.C. § 9-301. 
  Whether the validity and priority of a security interest should be determined by a 
court of the jurisdiction whose substantive law governs (in the example, a State A court) 
or by another state’s court (with or without the assistance of a State A court) is a separate 
issue, which I leave to others. 
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tive Guide on Secured Transactions (“UNCITRAL Secured Transactions 
Guide”).31 
B. Shortcomings of the Lex Situs Approach 
Uniform adoption of the choice of the lex situs would enhance predict-
ability greatly but is by no means ideal. The approach may require the 
bankruptcy court of one state to apply the secured-transactions law of 
another. Secured-credit regimes are widely diverse, and many secured-
transactions laws are complicated. Predictable outcomes are by no means 
assured, even if judges try their best. 
Moreover, even if every bankruptcy court were certain to apply the lex 
situs, a secured party never could be absolutely sure which nation’s se-
cured-transactions law would govern. This uncertainty arises because a 
secured party never can be certain where tangible collateral will be situ-
ated at any given moment in the future. I suspect that, in most cases, this 
uncertainty would be of little, if any, concern. Most tangible collateral 
does not move; it just sits there. Or, if it does move, its movement can be 
anticipated by the secured party. Security agreements typically prohibit 
the debtor from relocating the collateral without the consent of the se-
cured party. One cannot discount entirely the possibility that, shortly be-
fore entering bankruptcy, a debtor may relocate collateral with a view 
towards depriving the secured party of its security interest. For this stra-
tegic behavior to succeed, however, the secured-transactions law of the 
“new” location must be materially different from that of the “old” loca-
tion. To the extent that the substantive law of secured transactions be-
comes uniform, the risk is reduced. 
Of course, a more narrowly drawn choice-of-law rule or rule of sub-
stantive law might prevent this risk from materializing. Former Article 9 
directly addressed the risk that collateral will be relocated by giving ef-
fect to perfection accomplished under the law of the “old” situs for a 
fixed period of time after the collateral is removed to the “new” loca-
tion,32 and the UNCITRAL Secured Transactions Guide recommends the 
                                                                                                             
 31. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Draft legislative guide 
on secured transactions: terminology and recommendations 102 (July 17, 2006), 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V06/560/12/PDF/V0656012.pdf?OpenEleme
nt (last visited Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Secured Transactions Guide] (“The 
law should provide that, except as otherwise provided . . . , the creation, the effectiveness 
against third parties and the priority as against the rights of competing claimants of a 
security right in tangible property are governed by the law of the State in which the en-
cumbered asset is located.”) 
 32. See former U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) (2000). Under revised Article 9, the situs of the 
collateral is irrelevant to the choice of law governing perfection of nonpossessory secu-
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same approach.33 It remains to be seen whether narrowly drawn rules 
along these lines will be widely enacted. Another route to the same result 
may be to use equitable principles (or their non-common-law analog) to 
protect the secured party.34 Absent protection of some kind, a secured 
party will take into account the risk of debtor misbehavior in determining 
whether, and on what terms, to extend credit. In other words, the cost of 
credit can be expected to be greater. 
Although most types of tangible collateral remain stationary, certain 
types do move—they are meant to move—across national borders. 
Creditors of North American railroads face this problem today with re-
spect to rail cars. Creditors secured by these rail cars routinely assume 
that both U.S. and Canadian law will apply to their secured transactions, 
and so they perfect according to the laws of each. But the track on which 
the cars travel extends into Mexico, where security interests may be inef-
fective. Creditors deal with this by covenant, typically to the effect that at 
any given time only a specified small percentage of cars (say, five per-
cent) will be physically located in Mexico.35 Greater predictability would 
be accomplished if the secured-transactions law of every country were to 
afford the same recognition to any given security interest. This could be 
accomplished either by adopting the same substantive law of secured 
transactions or by including, as part of each nation’s secured transactions 
law, a choice-of-law rule that designates the same “home” jurisdiction 
for mobile goods. Former Article 9 followed the latter approach,36 which 
the UNCITRAL Secured Transactions Guide recommends.37 Perhaps a 
less unlikely method for reaching the same result is an international con-
vention. For example, UNIDROIT recently adopted a protocol on rail-
road rolling stock to accompany the Convention on International Inter-
ests in Mobile Equipment (“Cape Town Convention”).38 By adopting the 
                                                                                                             
rity interests. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001). Accordingly, revised Article 9 has no need 
for a provision comparable to former U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d). 
 33. UNCITRAL Secured Transactions Guide, supra note 31, at 106. 
 34. See, e.g., In re Howard’s Appliance Corp. v. Howard’s Appliance Corp., 874 F.2d 
88 (2d Cir. 1989) (imposing a constructive trust on collateral subject to an unperfected 
security interest where the secured party’s failure to file in the appropriate state resulted 
from the debtor’s wrongful relocation of the collateral). 
 35. Information from Louis P. Warchot, Senior Vice President for Law, Association 
of American Railroads. 
 36. For an example of the latter, see former U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (2000) (applying law 
of the debtor’s location to “goods which are mobile and which are of a type normally 
used in more than one jurisdiction”). U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(a). 
 37. UNCITRAL Secured Transactions Guide, supra note 31, at 102. 
 38. UNIDROIT, the International Institute on the Unification of Private Law, adopted 
The Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests In Mobile Equip-
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Cape Town Convention and the Rail Protocol, a State binds itself to rec-
ognize security interests in railway rolling stock that are created by a 
debtor situated within any Contracting State.39 
C. An Alternative Approach: The Location of the Debtor 
Linking the applicable law to the location of the debtor, rather than the 
location of the collateral, would eliminate the risk that the potential relo-
cation of collateral imposes on secured parties under the situs rule. A 
debtor-location rule also would provide a single applicable substantive 
law with respect to all the collateral of a given debtor, regardless of 
where the collateral is located and even if it lacks a physical location (as 
is the case with intangibles). Applying the substantive law of the debtor’s 
location may come close to mirroring the non-bankruptcy outcome, in-
asmuch as a court having jurisdiction over the debtor can compel the 
debtor to turn over the collateral to the secured party, even if the collat-
eral is located outside the court’s territorial reach. 
In the abstract, if asked to create a non-bankruptcy choice-of-law rule 
(that, in turn, would be followed in bankruptcy), secured creditors might 
well prefer a debtor-location rule to the costs attendant to a situs rule, 
i.e., restricting the movement of collateral by contract, monitoring its 
location, and pricing the remaining risk. In practice, however, their en-
thusiasm likely would be tempered by concerns over whether a debtor- 
location rule would become widely adopted and applied. One might ex-
pect a state’s40 legislature to be reluctant to require its courts to deter-
mine claims against property located within the state’s territory by refer-
ence to the substantive law of another state. One might expect a similar 
reluctance from a court asked to apply the substantive law of another 
state to property subject to its administration. And, to the extent that se-
curity interests might be governed by the lex situs outside bankruptcy, 
linking the applicable law in bankruptcy to the debtor’s location would 
mean that a secured party that wished to reduce its risk would need to 
incur the costs of satisfying the requirements of two different laws. 
                                                                                                             
ment On Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock on February 23, 2007. The Rail Pro-
tocol has not yet entered into force. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-
2007-railprotocol.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Rail Protocol]. 
 39. International Institute on the Unification of Private Law, Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment, art. 4(1), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Cape Town Convention]. 
 40. Here, I use “state” to mean “nation,” which is the usual meaning in the interna-
tional choice-of-law context. 
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Moreover, even if widespread agreement could be reached that the va-
lidity and priority of security interests in bankruptcy would be deter-
mined by the substantive law of the debtor’s location, it is by no means 
certain that a similar agreement can be reached on determining where a 
debtor is located. Jurisdiction over a debtor may lie in any one of a num-
ber of jurisdictions.41 The U.S. and Canadian secured-transactions re-
gimes, though similar in many regards, designate different debtor loca-
tions for choice-of-law purposes. Under the Canadian Personal Property 
Security Acts, a corporate debtor having more than one place of business 
is located at its chief executive office.42 Under revised Article 9, a do-
mestic corporation is located in its jurisdiction of organization.43 Like-
wise, recent international instruments addressing secured transactions 
differ significantly in their provisions with respect to a debtor’s location. 
For purposes of the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade (“Receivables Convention”), a debtor 
having more than one place of business is located in the place where its 
“central administration . . . is exercised.”44 In contrast, for purposes of 
the Cape Town Convention, a debtor is located in “any Contracting 
State: (a) under the law of which it is incorporated or formed; (b) where 
it has its registered office or statutory seat; (c) where it has its centre of 
administration; or (d) where it has its place of business.”45 
                                                                                                             
 41. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED States § 
421 (1987) (providing that a foreign state’s exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a per-
son is reasonable, and thus a judgment of its courts may be recognized by the U.S., if any 
one of several relationships between the person and the foreign state is present). 
 42. See, e.g., Personal Property Act, REVISED STAT. BRIT. COLUM. 1996, ch. 359, § 
7(1). Former Article 9 contained a similar rule. See former U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d). 
 43. See U.C.C. § 9-307(e). The Ontario PPSA may soon be amended to adopt a simi-
lar approach. See Proposed Amendment – 7(3), CONSOLIDATED STAT. ONTARIO 2006, c. 
34, Sched. E, § 3(2) (proposed amendment to Personal Property Security Act, 
CONSOLIDATED STAT. OF ONTARIO 1990, c. P.10, § 7(3)). 
 44. United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International 
Trade, art. 5(h), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/receivables/ctc-
assignment-convention-e.pdf#search=%22uncitral%20assignment%20receivable%22 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Receivables Convention]. 
 45. Cape Town Convention, supra note 39, art. 4(1), available at http://www.unidroit. 
org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf. The Cape Town Con-
vention uses a debtor’s location primarily to determine whether the Convention applies. 
See id. art. 3(1) (“Convention applies when, at the time of the conclusion of the agree-
ment creating or providing for the international interest, the debtor is situated in a Con-
tracting State”). However, it provides for declarations whereby a Contracting State may 
exclude from application of the Convention certain transactions “where the centre of 
main interests of all parties to such transaction is situated” in that Contracting State. See 
id. arts. 50, 1(n) (defining “internal transaction”). 
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Similar differences have arisen in the context of international bank-
ruptcy. The European Union Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceed-
ings provides that “the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and 
their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of 
which such proceedings are opened,”46 i.e., “the Member State within the 
territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interest [“COMI”] is situ-
ated.”47 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency takes 
a similar approach.48 Under both the EU Regulation and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, the place of the registered office is presumed to be a com-
pany’s COMI in the absence of proof to the contrary.49 But the Protocols 
to the Cape Town Convention provide that a debtor’s COMI “shall be 
deemed to be the place of the debtor’s statutory seat or, if there is none, 
the place where the debtor is incorporated or formed, unless proved oth-
erwise.”50 
As Jay Westbrook ably demonstrates in his contribution to this Sympo-
sium, the COMI standard is, and already has been, “subject to various 
interpretations.”51 As regards the choice of applicable bankruptcy law, 
flexibility may have its virtues, and, in the aggregate, these virtues may 
outweigh the attendant costs.52 However, secured creditors place a pre-
mium on certainty. Unlike tort victims and other involuntary creditors, 
secured parties choose their debtors and do so with care. Unlike unse-
cured creditors, who rely generally on a debtor’s creditworthiness, se-
cured creditors extend credit in reliance on their anticipated ability to 
have recourse against specific assets upon the debtor’s default. Given the 
unlikelihood of achieving widespread application of a debtor-location 
rule whose content is reasonably certain, secured creditors might well 
prefer to incur the costs attendant to the application of the lex situs. 
                                                                                                             
 46. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of May 29, 2000, art. 4, § 1, 2000 O.J. 
(L 160) 1, 5 [hereinafter EU Regulation]. 
 47. Id., art. 3, § 1. 
 48. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency With Guide to 
Enactment, art. 17, § 2(b) [hereinafter UNICTRAL Model Law] (defining “foreign main 
proceeding” by reference to “the State where the debtor has the centre of its main inter-
ests”). Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4) (2005), is to the same effect. 
 49. See EU Regulation, supra note 46, art. 3, § 1; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 
48, art. 16, § 3. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2005), is to the same effect. 
 50. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, art. I, § (2)(n), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2007) (defining “primary insolvency jurisdiction”); Rail Protocol, supra 
note 38, art. I, § (2)(d). 
 51. Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, supra note 5, at 1020. 
 52. See generally id. 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that there is much to recommend a 
choice-of-law rule under which a bankruptcy court applies the law of the 
situs (State A) to determine whether to give effect to a security interest. It 
also suggests that much might be gained from persuading jurisdictions 
that do not apply the lex situs to change their choice-of-law rule, at least 
for bankruptcy purposes if not also for non-bankruptcy purposes. Under 
the lex situs approach, if the law of State A would permit SP to reach the 
collateral, a bankruptcy court should give effect to SP’s security interest, 
even if the applicable non-bankruptcy law of the forum state would not 
give effect to this security interest. 
Suppose, conversely, that the non-bankruptcy law of the situs (State A) 
would refuse to permit SP to reach the collateral. The approach under 
discussion would suggest that, because SP would be unable to obtain 
value from the collateral without the debtor’s cooperation, the putative 
security interest would not be recognized in bankruptcy. SP would hold 
an unsecured claim in bankruptcy, regardless of which state is the bank-
ruptcy forum. This result would obtain even if the parties’ operations 
were centered in another nation (State B), the parties had agreed that 
State B’s substantive law would govern the creation of the security inter-
est, State B’s substantive law would have given effect to the security in-
terest between the parties, and a State B court actually had issued a 
judgment determining that the security interest is valid and enforceable 
between the parties. While this potential state of affairs underscores the 
desirability of moving towards uniformity in the substantive law of se-
cured transactions, the approach underlying it does provide a significant 
amount of certainty. 
D. Choosing the Law Governing Security Interests in Intangibles 
Whatever the advantages of a choice-of-law rule keyed to the location 
of the collateral may be, such a rule can have no application to intangi-
bles, which have no physical location.53 In fashioning a bankruptcy 
choice-of-law rule that, as a first approximation, tracks non-bankruptcy 
outcomes, one must take into account the fact that the value of many in-
tangibles depends in large part upon the cooperation of a third person, 
namely, the person who is obligated on the collateral. For example, the 
value of a debt owing to the debtor (i.e., a receivable owned by the 
debtor) depends in part on the obligor’s willingness to pay. A secured 
party who wishes to collect a receivable owed by a recalcitrant obligor 
                                                                                                             
 53. As a formal matter, the law might assign a “situs” to an intangible and use this 
fictional location for purposes of the lex situs rule. 
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(to use Article 9 terminology, “account debtor”)54 and who cannot suc-
ceed through persuasion must resort to the judicial process. This fact 
might argue for a choice-of-law rule keyed to the account debtor. On the 
other hand, the effectiveness of a secured party’s claim to rights in the 
receivable as against other claimants (e.g., competing creditors to whom 
the debtor has also purported to give a security interest) depends on 
which of the purported assignments is given effect and, if more than one 
is, on the relative priority of the assignments. This fact might argue for a 
choice-of-law rule keyed to the debtor. 
If we are looking to mimic the non-bankruptcy outcome where the is-
sues concern the relative rights of the debtor, secured party, and other 
claimants (including the bankruptcy administrator) to intangible prop-
erty, ought we look to the non-bankruptcy law of the account debtor’s 
location or to the non-bankruptcy law of the debtor’s location?55 A typi-
cal financing transaction involves the assignment of not one but many (if 
not all) of the assignor’s receivables, not all of which will be owed by 
account debtors located in a single jurisdiction (however determined). To 
reduce the cost of financing receivables, some non-bankruptcy law looks 
to the location of the debtor-assignor, at least with respect to questions of 
perfection and priority. This was the approach taken by former Article 
9,56 and it is the rule under revised Article 957 and the Receivables Con-
vention.58 It seems like a plausible rule for a court to apply in a bank-
                                                                                                             
 54. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) (2001) (definition of “account debtor”). 
 55. As the discussion above suggests, even if every jurisdiction applies the law of the 
debtor’s (or account debtor’s) location, the governing law may differ depending on each 
jurisdiction’s method of determining where a given debtor (or account debtor) is located. 
There are problems galore in determining the account debtor’s location for these pur-
poses, depending on how precisely one wishes to mimic non-bankruptcy outcomes. Ar-
guably, it could be any jurisdiction in which a judgment against the account debtor might 
be entered (i.e., with in personam jurisdiction over the debtor). Or perhaps it should be a 
jurisdiction that also has in rem jurisdiction over property of the account debtor’s that can 
be used to satisfy the judgment. 
 56. See former U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (2000). 
 57. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001). 
 58. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001); Receivables Convention, supra note 44, arts. 22 
(the law of the State in which the assignor is located governs priority), 5(i) (defining the 
“law” of a State to exclude the State’s choice-of-law rules). The UNCITRAL Secured 
Transactions Guide takes a similar approach. See UNCITRAL Secured Transactions 
Guide, supra note 31, at 104. 
  Although its primary focus is international interests (including security interests) 
in mobile equipment, the Cape Town Convention also applies to assignments of “associ-
ated rights,” i.e., “rights to payment or other performance by a debtor which are secured 
by or associated with” the equipment. See Cape Town Convention, supra note 39, ch. IX 
(dealing with, inter alia, assignments of associated rights), art. 1(c) (defining “associated 
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ruptcy proceeding, where the account debtors may be widely dispersed 
and where applying the substantive law of the account debtor’s location 
might require the bankruptcy court to examine the law of a large number 
of jurisdictions. And, if the bankruptcy forum also is determined by ref-
erence to the debtor’s location, a bankruptcy court deciding the validity 
and priority of a security interest under the substantive law of the 
debtor’s location may be more familiar with the law and thus more likely 
to apply it correctly. 
On the other hand, consider the case in which the non-bankruptcy law 
governing enforcement of the account debtor’s obligation would prevent 
the secured party from judicially enforcing its security interest against 
the account debtor. For example, that law may not recognize the validity 
of the security interest or may afford a remedy only to the original obli-
gee (here, the debtor). As between the debtor and secured party, only the 
debtor may be able to get value from the receivable through the judicial 
process. And, if the debtor collects that value, it should go to creditors 
generally. Suppose also that, as between the secured party and other 
creditors, a court in the debtor’s location would award any collections to 
the secured party and not to the debtor. One might argue that, to properly 
reflect the non-bankruptcy outcome, the substantive law of the account 
debtor’s location should apply to receivables that are uncollected at the 
time the debtor enters bankruptcy, whereas the law of the debtor’s loca-
tion should apply to determine the validity and priority of a security in-
terest in the collections held by the debtor at that time.59 
This bifurcated approach corresponds roughly with the approach to se-
curity interests in goods and other tangible property discussed above. 
The location of goods is analogous to the location of an account debtor; 
it is the jurisdiction whose courts have the power to enforce the security 
interest against the collateral. Consider the example in the preceding 
                                                                                                             
rights”). The Convention applies “when, at the time of the conclusion of the agreement 
creating or providing for the international interest, the debtor is situated in a Contracting 
State.” Id. art. 3(1). 
 59. One might say that security interests in pre-bankruptcy collections should be gov-
erned by the location of the proceeds, but these are likely to be intangible (most likely in 
some form of deposit account or investment property). 
  U.C.C. § 9-408(d) presents a situation similar to the one under discussion in the 
text. It contemplates security interests that attach to, but are only conditionally enforce-
able against, the original collateral; however, they are unconditionally enforceable against 
the proceeds of the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-408(d) (2001). The official comments sug-
gest that, once the proceeds arise, the security interest would attach to them even if the 
debtor is in bankruptcy. See U.C.C. § 9-408, cmt. 7 (2001). The comment assumes the 
applicability of Bankruptcy Code § 552, which gives effect to certain security interests in 
property acquired by the debtor during the bankruptcy case. 
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paragraph, with the collateral being goods rather than receivables. The 
goods are subject to a security interest that the law of the situs does not 
recognize. The earlier discussion of tangible collateral suggested that a 
bankruptcy proceeding should not recognize these security interests, 
even if they would be enforceable under the non-bankruptcy law of the 
forum, which might well be the law of the debtor’s location. 
Even if a bifurcated approach makes theoretical sense, it has serious 
practical drawbacks where the substantive law of the debtor’s location 
would yield a different result from the substantive law of the account 
debtor’s location. The debtor generally can control the timing of its entry 
into bankruptcy. Making the relative rights of the secured party and 
competing creditors turn on whether the receivables have been collected 
before the debtor enters bankruptcy would enable the debtor to allocate 
value among its competing creditors by deciding whether and when to 
collect receivables and whether and when to enter bankruptcy. In addi-
tion, the rule may be too complicated to achieve widespread accep-
tance.60 
Applying the same choice-of-law rule to all receivables, whether col-
lected or not, would seem to make more sense. The practical considera-
tions described above suggest that the law governing security interests in 
receivables should be the one applicable to collected receivables, i.e., the 
law of the debtor’s location.61 
IV. GOING BEYOND EFFECTIVENESS AND PRIORITY 
The foregoing presents an approach for developing a choice-of-law 
rule to govern whether a claim should be treated as secured in bank-
ruptcy and, if so, the relative priority of the security interest. We turn 
now to a brief consideration of other aspects of bankruptcy law that may 
affect the expected value of a bankruptcy distribution to a secured party. 
As discussed above, insofar as predictability and certainty are concerned, 
the choice-of-law rule generally should be one whose application would 
yield the non-bankruptcy outcome. But the desire to replicate the non-
bankruptcy world may conflict with the desire to obtain the benefits of a 
collective proceeding that takes account of the claims of all (or nearly 
all) the debtor’s creditors. Many bankruptcy rules are reasonably de-
                                                                                                             
 60. For example, questions may arise concerning when a receivable has or has not 
been “collected.” Consider, for example, a check that is in the process of being collected 
when the bankruptcy case begins. 
 61. Distinguishing between tangible and intangible property for choice-of-law pur-
poses creates line-drawing issues that may lead to uncertainty. For example, some legal 
systems reify certain receivables (and thus treat them as tangible for choice-of-law pur-
poses) that other legal systems treat as pure intangibles. 
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signed to foster the collectivist goals of a bankruptcy. These goals in-
clude maximizing the value of assets, reducing the costs attendant to 
creditor recovery (including the costs of administering the bankruptcy), 
and safeguarding the integrity of the proceeding. Most, if not all, of these 
collectivist rules have incidental effects on the distribution of a bankrupt 
debtor’s assets. In evaluating whether a secured party’s distribution 
should be affected by any particular bankruptcy rule, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between those rules where the distributional effect is incidental 
and those where it is not. To a considerable extent, the difference ulti-
mately may be a question of degree rather than of kind. 
Some adjustments to the rights of creditors arise from the fact that a 
bankruptcy court deals with a large number and wide variety of claims 
against a debtor. For example, the Bankruptcy Code often reflects a lev-
eling, rather than a precise valuation, of claims. Each unsecured claim is 
allowed by reference to the amount owing as of the commencement of 
the case, rather than by what the claim would be worth in the market at 
that time.62 A claim for $10,000 (including principal and accrued inter-
est) that bears interest at ten percent is more valuable outside bankruptcy 
than one bearing interest at five percent. However, under the Bankruptcy 
Code, each of these claims is allowed for the same amount, i.e., 
$10,000.63 An unmatured claim for $10,000 is allowed in its face 
amount, as is a claim that has been reduced to judgment and as to which 
execution may issue, as is a claim that has been paid or secured shortly 
before bankruptcy.64 
A fair amount of bankruptcy law is devoted to maximizing the total 
value of the assets that make up the bankruptcy estate. One way in which 
this maximization is accomplished is by automatically staying the en-
forcement of security interests, thereby preserving for the estate the 
benefit of any going-concern value or other synergies.65 The imposition 
                                                                                                             
 62. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (definition of “claim”), § 502(b) 
(2005). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. A creditor who receives payment of its unsecured claim shortly before bank-
ruptcy may be obligated to disgorge the payment for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. 
Likewise, a creditor who receives a security interest to secure its unsecured claim shortly 
before bankruptcy may lose the security for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. See id. § 
547 (providing for the avoidance of preferential transfers); § 550 (providing for recovery 
of avoided transfers); § 551 (providing that avoided transfers are preserved for the benefit 
of the estate). 
 65. See id. § 362(a) (imposing a stay of creditor activity upon the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition). The court must grant relief from the stay where the collateral is of no 
greater value in the hands of the estate than in the hands of the secured party or where 
stay puts the value of the security interest at risk. See U.C.C. § 362(d). 
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of the automatic stay gives rise to a set of provisions dealing with its ef-
fect, including those that determine what is to be done with the collateral 
while the stay remains in effect and those that address the risks associ-
ated with the stay.66 Although they are not couched in priority terms, the 
application of these provisions may have distributional effects.67 
Of particular concern to secured parties are bankruptcy rules that di-
rectly address the recognition of a security interest and its priority. This 
article has already discussed bankruptcy rules that invalidate security 
interests that are not enforceable outside bankruptcy against certain third-
party claimants.68 It suggested that, if such a rule applies, then the ques-
tion, “is the security interest enforceable outside bankruptcy against a 
judicial lien creditor?,” would be answered best by reference to the prior-
ity rules of the situs of the collateral. To return to an earlier example, 
suppose tangible collateral is located in State A and the debtor enters 
bankruptcy in State B. State B’s bankruptcy law invalidates security in-
terests that are junior to the rights of judicial lien creditors but State A’s 
does not. If this provision of State B’s bankruptcy law applies, then the 
analysis developed above would suggest that the security interest should 
be invalidated if, under the law of State A, it is junior to the rights of a 
lien creditor.69 
Among the bankruptcy rules that directly address the recognition of a 
security interest are rules that permit the avoidance of preferential trans-
                                                                                                             
 66. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C., § 542(a) (2005) (requiring the secured 
party to turn over collateral to the trustee in bankruptcy); § 363 (governing the sale and 
use of collateral); § 362(d)(1) (requiring a court to grant relief from the stay for cause, 
including lack of adequate protection of a security interest). 
 67. For example, under non-bankruptcy law, a secured creditor normally is free to 
take steps to liquidate the collateral and reinvest the proceeds immediately upon the 
debtor’s default. However, in bankruptcy an undersecured creditor who is stayed from 
enforcing its security interest is not entitled to be compensated for any reinvestment in-
come of which he is deprived. See United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc. 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988). 
 68. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2005). If one thinks that an un-
perfected secured party is more likely than an unsecured creditor ultimately to reach the 
asset in question, one may view the “strong-arm power” as another example of the “level-
ing” of claims. Alternatively, one might view the rule as, in essence, treating the assertion 
of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court over the asset for the purpose of distributing it to 
creditors as analogous to the acquisition of non-bankruptcy liens by each of the creditors 
in the case. 
 69. This example raises another important question: Which state’s bankruptcy avoid-
ance law should apply? Professor Westbrook took “the most tentative and preliminary 
first steps towards a general analysis” of this issue. Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law 
in Global Insolvencies, supra note 5, at 537. For the most part, this useful article did not 
address security interests. 
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fers.70 Historically, the avoidance of preferential transfers protected the 
integrity of the bankruptcy proceeding. These rules blunt the ability of 
certain creditors to “opt out” of an impending collective proceeding. 
They also can be viewed as a device for maximizing the value of the 
bankruptcy estate by discouraging creditors from bringing about a 
piecemeal distribution before the bankruptcy case has begun. To the ex-
tent that a preference law is reasonably designed to accomplish these 
goals, its distributional effects probably should be treated as incidental. A 
preference law may also reflect a policy of defeating secured claims in 
bankruptcy.71 To that extent, it would not seem to justify a departure 
from the baseline principle that bankruptcy should respect the non-
bankruptcy value of security interests. 
Avoidance provisions that address potential injury to all creditors also 
have a distributional effect. Fraudulent transfer rules might fall in this 
category, though only roughly speaking. One can easily imagine creditor 
misconduct that is injurious to some of the other creditors yet gives rise 
to a remedy that benefits all.72 To the extent that these remedies are un-
available under applicable non-bankruptcy law, what justifies imposing 
them in bankruptcy?73 Arguably, the presence of fraudulent transfer pro-
visions in the bankruptcy law reflects a policy to deter, or condemn, con-
duct that has the potential to be injurious to many. Even if the bankruptcy 
law were to incorporate applicable non-bankruptcy fraudulent transfer 
law, determining the non-bankruptcy choice-of-law rules for fraudulent 
transfers may be difficult. 
                                                                                                             
 70. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2005). 
 71. As applied to security interests, U.S. preference law may not necessarily reflect 
either an anti-opt-out or an estate-maximizing policy. Given the automatic stay and the 
trustee’s right to use collateral during the bankruptcy, avoiding a security interest would 
seem to have a distributional effect without increasing the value of the estate. Although 
an avoidance that results solely from a delay in perfection might be addressing an opt-out 
problem (as where the secured party’s concern about a potential bankruptcy motivates the 
secured party to investigate the status of its security interest and fix any shortcoming in 
perfection), it seems at least equally likely to be promoting an independent distributive 
goal. 
 72. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2005) (affording to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy the power to avoid fraudulent transfers and fraudulent obligations); § 544(b) (af-
fording to the trustee in bankruptcy the power to avoid fraudulent transfers and fraudulent 
obligations that are avoidable under applicable non-bankruptcy law and preserve the 
entire avoided transfer for the benefit of the estate, even if only a single creditor would 
have been able to avoid the transfer outside bankruptcy). 
 73. Jackson has suggested that the avoidance power in Bankruptcy Code § 548 may 
be to eliminate any need to find an aggrieved creditor under non-bankruptcy law. See 
JACKSON, supra note 9, at 146–47. 
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Last, there are bankruptcy rules that are openly distributive. Principles 
of equitable subordination can be used to subordinate secured claims by 
allocating the value of a secured party’s collateral to competing credi-
tors.74 In some jurisdictions, unsecured claims of a particular type enjoy 
priority in collateral. To the extent they subordinate claims that would 
not be subordinated outside bankruptcy and do so without a bankruptcy-
related reason, these openly (re)distributive rules impose costs without 
conferring any offsetting benefits. Redistributive rules that promote the 
interests of a designated class of creditors may be particularly difficult to 
remove, as they may represent a strongly held value judgment of the 
people of the bankruptcy jurisdiction or may be the product of a politi-
cally powerful group. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Resolving the tension between, on one hand, replicating non-
bankruptcy results so as to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty 
costs and, on the other hand, achieving the cost savings that come from a 
single collective proceeding is a difficult task that may never be fully 
accomplished. There is some experience to suggest that agreement of 
choice-of-law rules may be easier to forge than agreement on substantive 
law. One step in the right direction would be the widespread adoption of 
choice-of-rules that determine whether a creditor holds a secured claim 
in bankruptcy and, if so, the priority of that claim, by reference to the 
substantive law of the location of collateral, where the collateral is tangi-
ble, and to the location of the debtor, where the collateral is intangible. In 
addition, where a secured transaction touches more than one state, a uni-
versally shared choice-of-law rule giving effect to the bankruptcy avoid-
ance law of a specified jurisdiction would significantly increase the value 
of the security interest. 
As the values promoted by collective insolvency systems coalesce, the 
differences among non-bankruptcy secured-credit regimes will be re-
duced. And, to the extent bankruptcy law reflects the values that underlie 
the non-bankruptcy legal regimes, we will get increasingly consistent 
results in bankruptcy as the non-bankruptcy laws become increasingly 
similar. This suggests we ought to proceed along parallel tracks: to move 
towards generally accepted choice-of-law rules, to regularize the non-
bankruptcy law governing creditors’ rights (which, in this context, in-
                                                                                                             
 74. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2005). Compare id. § 506(c), which 
allows the trustee in bankruptcy to recover from collateral “the reasonable, necessary 
costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of [the collateral] to the extent of any 
benefit to the holder of [the secured claim].” 
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cludes not only moving towards consistent secured-transactions laws but 
also regularizing the ability of creditors to reach assets through the judi-
cial process, with respect to both property claims and in personam 
claims), and to eliminate the most egregious distributional effects of 
bankruptcy avoidance powers. 
